In this piece, Ze'ev Schiff is reflecting the anxiety of the Israeli security elite that UNIFIL will be given a larger role in implementing a ceasefire. Schiff is being quite disingenuous in his analysis. The original mandate, UN Resolution 425, did not create UNIFIL in 1978 to protect Israel. The point of the resolution was for UNIFIL to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, and to assist the Lebanese government in restoring it control over southern Lebanon after Israel invaded Lebanon.
Israel at that did not withdraw in full. Instead, it left behind a cadre of agents to work with a proxy militia headed by Sa'ad Haddad. Through a process of intimidation, political pressure and violence, the proxy militia, acting with full Israeli support, did its best to prevent UNIFIL from operating in its area. When UN peacekeepers were assassinated or attacked, as in al-Tiri or in al-Qantarah in the early 1980s, Israel was pulling the strings. I was there.
After the 1978 war, which left the PLO in place because of Israel's failure in the Litani Operation, UNIFIL was obliged to accept the reality that both the PLO and Israel were the real players in southern Lebanon.
After the 1982 war, Israel occupied about 10% of Lebanese territory and prevented UNIFIL from operating in the areas where it operated.
When Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000, it was not the mission of UNIFIL to attack Hizballah, whose legitimacy was emphasized by the Lebanese government.
Resolution 1559 of 2004 does not task UNIFIL to protect Israel, contrary to Schiff's claims.
Finally, UNIFIL is the product of its constituent national parts. In other words, it can only be as effective as the national governments that contribute troops allow it to be.
A recipe for disaster - Haaretz - Israel News
These are comments by Timur Goksel, who served for a quarter century with UNIFIL, and Tom Milo, a Dutch linguist and former peacekeeper. Milo, a former colleague, offers timely reflections on the challenges faced by UNIFIL in its early years of deployment. The belligerents, including Israel, often interfered in its operation. If a new forced is deployed in southern Lebanon, either to bolster UNIFIL or as an autonomous entity, it will face many of the same problems.
3 comments:
From Timur Goksel, long-time political advisor to UNIFIL and a walking encyclopedia on peackeeping in southern Lebanon:
You are not missing anything except perhaps post-2000 when UNIFIL was cut down in size because of a] US financial concerns, and b] to force Lebgovt to send the army to the border. Since then UNIFIL has no true AO, no checkpoints, no security function whatever except to observe and report with two small battalions totaling not more than 900.
I have been slashing out some like Schiff who have declared UNIFIL a non-starter because it is not doing this or that to Hizballah. Other day I told a reporter on al Hurra I said: "UNIFIL is doing what you assigned it to do."
The original Area of Operations of the United Nations Interim Force In
Lebanon UNIFIL was planned as a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) stretching from the
Israeli border North up to the Litani River – just like today’s proposed AO
in 2006. However, in reality the AO was dented by uncooperative belligerents
and sabotaged by proxies from both sides: The PLO invalidated the UNIFIL
mandate by maintaining positions in and around Tyre (resulting in the
so-called Tyre Pocket and the Iron Triangle [IJzeren Driehoek]) while Israel
frustrated the UN by refusing UNIFIL to deployment within a 10 mile wide
border strip (hence euphemistically known as De Facto Forces Enclave). The
local population tolerated UNIFIL in a relatively cooperative spirit, given
the fact that UNIFIL operation targeted foreigners, i.e., Palestinians,
Israeli’s and their Quislings. A future force in the same area will have to
face elements of the local Lebanese population.
UNIFIL strength in 1980 was about 6000 troops, drawn from a dozen of
nations. As for the force itself, it consisted of lightly armed infantry, or
police masquerading as such (part of the Fiji force was drawn from civilian
police). Only the French (withdrawn in 1979), the Dutch and the Norwegians
deployed robustly equipped NATO-grade combat battalions – exactly the kind
of troops Israel demands today to be sent. With 6000 men, UNIFIL was thinly
spread: the Dutch Armoured Bataillion for instance had 600 men infantry (out
of 816 troops) to cover an area of roughly 10 by 20 miles. Taking rest and
maintenance schedules into the balance, this equalled 200 men for 200 square
miles. But at least it had 54 armoured personnel carriers – more than all
the other UNIFIL units had together.
Not all troops were willing or able to operate neutrally. A case in point
was the Senegalese battalion (SENBAT), located on the northern edge of Tyre
Pocket. During the summer of 1980 it undertook no action at all when its AO
was overrun by PLO proxies. In fact, SENBAT failed even to alert UNIFIL HQ.
(this writer joined then major Dick Norton in a reconnaissance mission where
we discovered the takeover). SENBAT was later withdrawn. UNIFIL deployed its
more robust – or simply better motivated - units (Dutch, Irish, Norwegian)
closest to the Israeli border, putting them in the optimal position for
intercepting attacks on Israel – with the paradoxical consequence that
precisely these troops took the brunt of the IDF aggression against UNIFIL
(shelling, machine-gunning and occasional incursions).
Round-the-clock operations consisted, among other things, of intensive
patrolling, maintaining static and dynamic road-blocks, active blocking of
armed movements from both sides, preventing the DMZ from being taken over by
the belligerents, neutralizing the existing pockets of armed belligerents
inside the DMZ, stopping the establishment of new armed positions within the
DMZ, observation and intelligence gathering and maintaining regular formal
contacts with all sides. UNIFIL Operations stopping armed infiltration
attempts by PLO were routinely endangered by IDF and proxy machine gun fire
and mortar shelling, while routine UNIFIL patrols inside its AO were exposed
to ambushes and attacks by PLO and proxies, as well armed robbers from among
their ranks. Kidnappings of UNIFIL personnel were undertaken by – the
proxies of - both sides.
For the planners of a future Stabilization Force (the word Peace seems to
have fallen out of grace) it is important to understand that South Lebanon
is the place were most of today’s irregular tactics evolved, including those
seen later during the West Bank intifada’s. PLO agents were known to wear
suicide belts more or less as standard issue, as a last resort in a manner
comparable with parachutes for pilots. Suicide tactics using vehicles were
just beginning. Also, the method of hijacking and butchering individuals was
still in its infancy.
Thomas Milo
UNIFIL 1980-'83
Royal Netherlands Army
Captain with s2/3 BatstafDutchbat
Expanded comments by Thomas Milo
The UN adopted a resolution calling or a new, robust mandate for UNIFIL to enable it to separate the belligerents. Particularly the promise to send a similarly sized Lebanese force to South Lebanon offers new and hopeful perspectives. But the fact remains that peacekeepers will be sent into a dangerous military and political snake pit. The new UNIFIL is bound to encounter the very same factors that caused it to fail in the past. Therefore it is wise to recapitulate the circumstances that prevented UNIFIL to accomplish its mission to date.
In 1978 the original Area of Operations of the United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon UNIFIL was planned as a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) stretching from the Israeli border North up to the Litani River – just like today’s proposed AO in 2006. However, before the ink of the agreement was dry, the AO was already dented by uncooperative belligerents, while the actual peace-keeping was continually sabotaged by proxies from both sides.
To the North, the PLO invalidated the UNIFIL mandate from day one by maintaining positions in and around Tyre. Consequently two large sectors, known as Tyre Pocket and the Iron Triangle, remained outside the control of UNIFIL. PLO dismissed UN protests with the pretence that these positions were in the hands of elements that strictly speaking were not part of its organization.
To the South it was Israel that frustrated the UN by refusing UNIFIL fully to deploy. Within a 10 mile wide border strip Israel handed control to a gang of Lebanese Army deserters, the so-called Christian militias. Israel, too, dismissed UN protests pretending that it had no control of its Quislings. As a result of this manipulation this area, too, remained outside of UNIFIL control and became known euphemistically as De Facto Forces Enclave.
The local population tolerated UNIFIL to a certain extent. In fact, the expectation that UNIFIL would put an end to the presumptuous liberties of foreigners, i.e., of Palestinians, Israeli’s and their proxies, occasionally lead to cooperation. A future force in the same area will have to face the possibility that such armed elements now originate from among the local Lebanese population.
Israel’s occupation of South Lebanon in 1982 terminated UNIFIL as a peace keeping force. After all, its core mission – demilitarization, restoration of Lebanese sovereignty – was permanently made impossible. The Netherlands withdrew its DUTCHBAT from South Lebanon in 1983.
UNIFIL strength in 1980 was about 6000 troops, drawn from a dozen of nations. As for the force itself, it consisted of lightly armed infantry, or police acting as such (part of the Fiji force was drawn from civilian police). Some of the less wealthy country sent what amounted to “naked men” to be clothed, fed, armed and equipped with second-hand soft skinned vehicles.
France, however, sent real combat troops that immediately started an offensive operation to bring Tyre Pocket and the Iron Triangle under UNIFIL control. The losses they incurred were such, that the Régiment Parachutistes de la Marine was withdrawn within a year. This left a bloody, yawning gap in the UNIFIL deployment with no nations volunteering to fill it. Suddenly the Netherlands became eligible for UN duty (following the sixteen year long colonial war against emerging Indonesia, the largest Moslem state, all previous Dutch offers had been dismissed). Totally inexperienced, the Dutch government removed a fully-equipped armoured infantry battalion from the Cold War battle order in the North German Plains – with 260 vehicles including 54 armoured personnel carriers. All in all only the Norwegians and the Dutch provided NATO-grade combat battalions to UNIFIL – exactly the kind of combat units that Israel’s PM Olmert of Israel today demands from the “world community”.
With 6000 men, UNIFIL was thinly spread: the Dutch Armoured Battalion for instance had 600 men infantry (out of 816 troops) to cover an area of roughly 10 by 20 kilometres. Taking leave, rest and maintenance schedules into the balance, this boiled down to 200 men for 200 square kilometres (roughly one-eighth of the total UNIFIL territory). Presently, in 2006, UNIFIL has only 900 men, while the size of the AO remained more or less the same.
On paper the proposed new force already shrunk from 30.000 to 15.000 men. What makes the new plans hopeful is the promise of a similar number of regular Lebanese Army troops for deployment in the South. This surely makes acceptance by the local population more likely, while the total of the force will match the required number of 30.000. In 1980 each UNIFIL battalion was augmented by only one Lebanese platoon of about 25 men lightly armed infantry.
It is doubtful whether the UN will be able to draft even 15.000 troops of the required quality for permanent deployment in the Lebanon. Yet, to be effective, the number of troops should not drop below 10.000, as was the case with UNIFIL. Because unavoidably, in addition to prohibitively expensive Western combat units, also units from the poorer countries will be included – for some of which sending troops out of necessity is a source of income rather then one of expenditure. Funding of peacekeeping is a moot point indeed. Dutchbat’s 54 armoured cars – half of Unifi’s mobile fire power in 1980 – occasionally became unserviceable as the fuel budget ran out. After Israel gave up its occupation of South Lebanon in 2000, the US cut its financial support for UNIFIL, which lead to the reduction to its present miniature size.
As it turned out, not all UNIFIL troops operated in a strictly neutral way. A case in point was the Senegalese battalion (SENBAT), located on the northern edge of Tyre Pocket. During the summer of 1980 it undertook no action at all when its AO was overrun by PLO proxies. In fact, SENBAT failed even to alert UNIFIL HQ. (This writer accompanied then major Dick Norton US Army / OGL in a reconnaissance mission that discovered the takeover). SENBAT was withdrawn not much later.
Round-the-clock operations consisted, among other things, of intensive patrolling, maintaining static and dynamic road-blocks, active blocking of armed movements from both sides, preventing the DMZ from being taken over by the belligerents, neutralizing the existing pockets of armed belligerents inside the DMZ, stopping the establishment of new armed positions within the DMZ, observation and intelligence gathering and maintaining regular formal contacts with all sides. In addition to that UNIFIL cared as much as possible for the many civilian casualties caused by scattered unexploded ordnance. Today, UNIFIL has been reduced to a group of passive observers – while from the Israeli border well up to the Litani river the area is teeming again with cluster bombs.
UNIFIL deployed its more robust units (Dutch, Irish, Norwegian) closest to the Israeli border, putting them in the best position for stopping attacks on Israel – with the bizarre result that precisely these troops took the brunt of the IDF aggression against UNIFIL (random shelling, machine-gunning and occasional offensive incursions). UNIFIL soldiers intercepting armed infiltration attempts by PLO were routinely endangered by IDF and proxy machine gun fire and mortar shelling. Kidnappings of UNIFIL personnel were undertaken by both sides. One hopes that PM Olmert of Israel understands that robust neutral intervention also entails dealing effectively with rogue initiatives one the part IDF personnel.
Routine UNIFIL patrols inside its AO also were exposed to ambushes and attacks - or plain armed robberies - by PLO and proxies. It was just a matter of sheer luck that not many more peacekeepers fell in the course of their duties.
For the planners of a new, robust UNIFIL it is important to understand that South Lebanon is the place were most of today’s irregular tactics emerged, from children stoning soldiers to exploding ambulances. In 1979 PLO guerrillas were already discovered to wear explosive belts to avoid capture – defensive suicide. Offensive suicide tactics using vehicles were only just beginning. Also, the method of hijacking and butchering individuals was still in its infancy. Nevertheless at least four UN peacekeepers fell victim to such barbarisms. The new stabilization force will have to operate under conditions were these practices have fully matured.
Finally, UNIFIL with its invigorated forces must claim its complete mandate immediately and unconditionally from the Israeli border in the South to the agreed limit in the North. The Sovereign Lebanese State must exercise its authority in confronting local militants. In this confrontation UNIFIL must lend powerful support to the Lebanese military, whilst ensuring that the UN mandate is in no way compromised. The Sovereign State of Israel should exercise its authority and suppress irregular actions of its military personnel by subjecting its armed forces to the reigns of the body politic.
After all, as long as peacekeepers have to operate between undisciplined warriors without knowledge of or respect for international agreements, the new UNIFIL risks going down the same road as the old one.
Thomas Milo studied Slavic and Turkic languages
former captain Royal Netherlands Army (RNLA)
Arabic Interpreter S2/3 Batstaff Dutchbat UNIFIL 1980-‘83
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